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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 32-AcCELERATED JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: Determination made in criminal prosecution
may not be relitigated in subsequent civil action.
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, an identical issue neces-
sarily adjudicated in a prior action may not be relitigated in a sub-
sequent action if a party had a full opportunity to contest the previous
determination.7 9 The bar may be raised by one who was not a party
to the first action.80 In New York, for reasons that are primarily his-
torical,8 ' however, the doctrine has not been applied where the prior
determination was made in a criminal prosecution,82 although a
criminal conviction is prima facie evidence of the issues necessarily
decided previously in a subsequent civil action.8
In Vavolizza v. Krieger, 4 the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, removed this restriction, holding that the plaintiff, who had
previously pleaded guilty in a federal criminal action, was collaterally
estopped from maintaining a subsequent malpractice action against his
attorney therein for allegedly coercing him to plead guilty, on the basis
of the federal court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to withdraw his
plea.815
In opposing the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of
collateral estoppel, the plaintiff did not contend that he had not been
given a full opportunity to prove his allegation of coercion; he argued
that since there had been no hearing on the motion to withdraw the
plea, the doctrine should not apply. In rejecting this argument, the
court stated that it is not essential that testimony be taken.88 The court
79 Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. R1v. 135, 144 (1969); Vavolizza v.
Krieger, 29 App. Div. 2d 446, 326 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Ist Dep't 1972). See Rosenberg, Collateral
Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165 (1969).
80 Vavolizza v. Krieger, 39 App. Div. 2d 446, 448, 36 N.Y.S.2d 748, 750 (1st Dep't
1972), citing Israel v. Wood Do]son Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 124 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1956), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. Rzv. 125, 147-48 (1969).
81 In Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 210, 312, 179 N.E. 711 (1932), the Court of
Appeals stated the reasons as "the dissimilarity of object, procedure and degree and ele-
ments of proof in the two trials .... "
82 See, e.g., Clark v. Nannery, 292 N.Y. 105, 54 N.E.2d 21 (1944); In re Rechtschaffen's
Estate, 278 N.Y. 226, 16 N.E.2d 357 (1928) (dictum); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y.
210, 179 N.E. 711 (1932); Casler v. State, 3 App. Div. 2d 305, 307 N.Y.S.2d 695 (4th Dep't
1970).
83 See, e.g., Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 210, 179 N.E. 711 (1932); Uzenski v.
Fitzsimmons, 10 App. Div. 2d 890, 201 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 11 App. Div.
2d 716, 205 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1960).
84 29 App. Div. 2d 446, 36 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1st Dep't 1972) (3-2).
85 The plaintiff declined to withdraw his guilty plea at the time of his sentence. Six
months later, he sought to vacate the plea. He had changed attorneys prior to sentencing.
Id. at 447, 36 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
86 Id. at 448, 36 N.Y.82d at 751.
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also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the principle of collateral
estoppel cannot be applied where the prior proceeding was a criminal
prosecution, noting that mutuality of estoppel is no longer required87
and finding it "very significant"88 that in Schindler v. Royal Insurance
Co., 9 the Court of Appeals stated that in the absence of that doctrine,
a prior criminal determination could be the basis of collateral estoppel
in a subsequent civil action.
The dissent, which contested the majority's finding that the issues
in this proceeding had been previously adjudicated, argued that the
essence of the plaintiff's malpractice "seems to be [that it was] bad
legal advice to take a plea of guilty.... [P]laintiff might, given the
opportunity, be able to prove that he had available a good defense
to the indictment." 90
It is laudable that Vavolizza eliminated the anachronistic distinc-
tion91 between a criminal determination and a civil proceeding made
in prior New York cases in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
In lieu of granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, however, it
would have been preferable for the court to admit the denial of the
plaintiff's motion to withdraw his plea in order to establish that the
plea had not been coerced and then to permit the plaintiff to litigate
the broader question of the defendant's alleged malpractice on grounds
other than coercion.
CPLR 3215(a): Court sua sponte dismisses complaint for improper
service in response to plaintiff's motion for default judgment.
CPLR 3215(c) provides for dismissal of a complaint as abandoned,
in the discretion of the court, where the plaintiff has failed to proceed
to enter a default judgment for more than one year after default. 92 In
such a case, Career Placements Inc. v. Sibilia,9 3 the Nassau County
District Court held that the summons was not properly served where
the process server's affidavit failed to state facts constituting diligent
effort to effect personal service94 before resort was had to substituted
87 Id. at 449, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
88 Id. at 448, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
89 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
90 39 App. Div. 2d at 449, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
91 In federal cases, no such distinction is made. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 US.
298 (1957) (dictum); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951);
United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); United States v. Fabric Garment Co.,
366 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Guzzone, 273 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1959).
927B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3215, commentary at 870-71 (1970); 4 WK&-M 3215.13,
3215.14, 3215.15.
93 71 Misc. 2d 345, 336 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
94 Id., 336 N.Y.S.2d at 84, citing Blatz v. Benschine, 53 Misc. 2d 352, 278 N.YS.2d 533
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. Rrv.
1973]
